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THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
THE LEGAL SERVICES INDUSTRY AND
THE CAREERS OF LAWYERS
GEORGE

P. BAKER*& RACHEL PARKIN**

We use the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory to explore how
changes in the nature of the relationship between law firms and
their clients may have implications for the structure of the legal
services industry, the organization of law firms, and legal careers.
We find evidence consistent with a shift toward a commodity
relationship and an increased reliance on business-getting.
Specifically, we find some evidence of a disappearance of the
midsized firm and strong evidence of a rise in the largestfirms and
multi-office firms. We find that leverage is increasing, though
mostly in the smaller and midsized firms. We find that promotion
clocks are increasingly longer and that firms are lessening their use
of "up-or-out" promotionpolicies.
1636
1638
A. PrimaryData Download....................................................
1639
B. Cleaning Up the Data .........................................................
1641
1. The Consistency of Firm, Lawyer, and Office IDs ... 1641
2. Elimination of D uplicates ............................................
1641
3. Assigning Lawyers to Positions ................................... 1641
4. Aggregating Quarterly Data into Annual Data ........ 1641
C. Restrictions to the Sample ..................................................
1642
1. Elimination of International Lawyers ........................ 1643
2. Elimination of Small Firms .......................................... 1643

INTRO D U CTIO N .....................................................................................
1.
DESCRIPTION OF MARTINDALE-HUBBELL DATA ...............

* Herman C. Krannert Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business
School; A.B., 1979, Harvard College; M.B.A., 1984, Harvard Business School; Ph.D., 1986,
Harvard University. Contact: gbaker@hbs.edu. We would like to thank MartindaleHubbell for their generosity in providing the data and helpful guidance with this project.
We would also like to thank participants in the Symposium on "Empirical Studies of the
Legal Profession: What Do We Know About Lawyers' Lives?" at the University of North
Carolina School of Law, and especially Jake Barnes for his helpful comments.
** Ph.D. Candidate, Harvard University; B.A., 1998, University of Virginia; A.M.,
2004, Harvard University. Contact: rparkin@hbs.edu.

1636

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

3. Elimination of Duplicate Office Listings ...................
4. Elimination of Demotions ...........................................
D. Other Lawyer and Firm Characteristics...........................
1. Lawyer Characteristics .................................................
2. Firm Characteristics ......................................................
E. D escriptive Statistics............................................................

II.
III.

1644
1646
1646
1646
1648
1648
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH .............................................
1652
ANALYZING THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES ............... 1653
A. Effects of the Decline of Relationship Lawyering ............ 1653
B . Firm Size ..............................................................................
1656
C. GeographicDiversification................................................ 1662
D. L everage............................................
1663
E . L egal Careers.......................................................................
1669

IV .

FUTURE R ESEARCH ..................................................................
1675
C O N CLU SIO N S .......................................................................................
1677
A PPEND IX .............................................................
1679

A. Assigning ConsistentIDs ...................................................
1. Assigning Consistent Lawyer IDs ...............................
2. Assigning Consistent Firm IDs ...................................
3. Assigning Consistent Office IDs .................................
B. Eliminating QuarterlyDuplicates .....................................
1. Assigning Lawyer to Quarterly Position ....................
2. Assigning Lawyer to Quarterly Firm .........................

1679
1679
1679
1680
1681
1681
1681

INTRODUCTION

Very rarely do academics get an opportunity to study both the
internal operations of firms and the interaction of firms in an
industry. Most empirical research follows either a panel of firms over
time or the careers of individuals in a single firm. However, the
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory ("Martindale") contains detailed
biographical information at both the level of the law firm and the
individual lawyer for nearly all law firms and lawyers in America.
Having data on firms and individuals across the entire industry allows
us to link changes in the organizational structures and policies of
individual firms to changes at the aggregate industry level.
In this study of the legal market, we use the Martindale data
from 1998 through 2004 to explore, document, and refute some
"stylized facts" about the legal services industry.1 Because the

1. "Stylized facts" are observations noted in so many contexts that they are taken as
empirical truths. Online Glossary of Research Economics, Stylized Facts, http://www.
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Martindale directory contains a near census of the legal services
industry, we have the opportunity to determine exactly what changes
have occurred in the industry and whether a number of popular
beliefs are true. Specifically, we will explore how changes in the
nature of the profession may have implications for the structure of
the legal services industry, the organization of law firms, and the
progression of legal careers.
By the "legal services" industry, we mean the group of private
practice law firms that serve the legal needs of individual and
especially corporate clients. While this industry is often referred to as
"the legal profession," we avoid the use of this term because we wish
to focus on those aspects of the profession-the organization and
interaction of firms, the structure of these firms, and the labor market
that supplies them-that reflect economic and competitive forces
rather than issues of professional norms and values. In this sense, this
study treats the legal profession like a group of companies competing
in an industry, trying to succeed by meeting the needs of its customers
and employees.
Perhaps the most significant change in the legal services industry
in the last twenty-five years has been the rise of corporate in-house
counsels and the accompanying change in the nature of the
relationship between law firms and their clients. This transformation,
which some have described as "the decline of relationship lawyering,"
has led to a number of changes in the structure of firms, the structure
of the industry, and legal careers. Corporate clients have become less
attached to their law firms, and are more likely to "shop" for legal
help. They have also brought more work in-house and changed the
nature of work referred to outside law firms. The significance of
"rainmaking," the process of attracting clients, has increased, leading
to higher mobility in the legal labor market and an increase in meritbased partnership pay.2
The consequences of these trends are many and varied. Some
commentators have predicted the demise of the midsized, full-service
law firm, arguing that this organizational form is likely to lose out in
competition with larger firms and smaller, more focused boutiques
who tailor the scale and scope of their services to meet the new needs
econterms.com/glossary.cgi?action=++Search++&query=stylized+facts
15, 2006).

(last visited Apr.

2. See Jonathan Lindsey et al., Compensation Is Key To Attracting and Retaining
Rainmakers, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP & BENEFITS REP., July 2002, at 1. For a discussion
of the compensation overhaul at Rogers & Wells, see Susan Hansen, The Young and the
Restless, AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 67.
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of corporate counsel. Firms may also increase their geographic scope
as an additional means of creating value for clients. Another
consequence of the changing nature of client-firm relationships is a
change in the structure of law firms. With partners spending more
time on rainmaking, higher leverage is necessary in order to have
enough lawyers to actually do the legal work. Along with this change
in structure comes a change in the nature of legal careers:
lengthening promotion "clocks" and the weakening of "up-or-out"
promotion systems are both likely consequences of the increased
reliance on business generation.
In this Article, we explore and document these changes in the
industry, firm structure, and careers. We find some, though not very
compelling, evidence for a decline in midsized firms relative to
smaller firms. We find a strong trend toward larger firms, and
especially large increases in the number of multi-office firms. We
document increasing leverage in the industry, though this is mostly
evident in smaller and midsized firms. We find that the average time
to promotion is increasing across the industry, and we find some
provocative evidence for a decline in the use of up-or-out promotion
systems.
The Martindale data is extremely rich and has the potential to
address many interesting questions beyond the scope of the current
analysis. In future work, we hope to explain the variation in the
mechanism by which firms grow and shrink. In addition, we plan to
study differences in firms' choices of human resource policies,
including those that govern promotion, recruiting, and training.
Having data that tracks both firms and lawyers over time also
provides a unique context for addressing questions about legal
careers. In particular, we would like to consider how the progression
of careers differs with respect to gender, lateral movement, and
specialization. Outside of the opportunity to study the legal services
industry specifically, we can also use Martindale to shed light on other
issues pertaining more generally to professional service firms.
The Article proceeds as follows:
Part I documents the
development of the data, Part II outlines the methodological
approach, Part III presents our empirical results, and Part IV
discusses potential extensions.
I. DESCRIPTION OF MARTINDALE-HUBBELL DATA

For our analysis, we are using data from the Martindale-Hubbell
Law Directory. The Martindale directory has been published (in
print form) for over one hundred years and is widely known as the
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legal services industry's most comprehensive professional directory.3

While there is no requirement that firms list, listing in Martindale has
become standard practice for virtually all law firms in America.'

Martindale offers free basic listings for firms and lawyers, offers
premium listings for a fee, and charges subscribers for its directories.5
While sole practitioners and very small firms may not all list, we are

confident that the Martindale directory represents a near census of
the legal services industry for lawyers in firms of more than a few
people.6
A.

PrimaryData Download

We received quarterly data directly from Martindale starting
from the first quarter of 1997, the first year that Martindale retained a

3. Martindale recently sponsored a survey of law firms and corporate law
departments to learn more about customers' usage patterns. The findings indicate that
86% of corporate and 90% of law firm respondents use Martindale and 74% of corporate
and 81% of law firm respondents express reluctance to hire a lawyer or law firm not listed
in Martindale. Of lawyers practicing at large private law firms, 97% consider Martindale
to be an important mechanism for delivering detailed information about their firms to
buyers of legal services. New Research Shows High Usage of Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory: Results for Corporate Law Departments, http://www.martindale.com/xp/
Martindale/AboutUs/DirectoryUsageSurvey/survey-corp.xml (last visited Apr. 15,
2006); New Research Shows High Usage of Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory: Results
for Law Firms, http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/AboutUsfDirectory-UsageSurvey/survey-firms.xml (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
4. In other research on the legal services industry, Garicano and Hubbard use
establishment-level data from the U.S. Census which "includes .. . 219,033 lawyers ...
constitut[ing] about ...50% of privately-practicing lawyers in the United States in 1992."
See Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The
Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9719, 2003), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/
9719.html. This implies that there were about 440,000 lawyers working in private practice
in 1992. Using the same data sample, Garicano and Hubbard find that 62.6% of all
lawyers work in law offices of at least five lawyers. See Luis Garicano & Thomas N.
Hubbard, Hierarchies and the Organization of Specialization 44 tbl.1 (Sept. 2003)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/imio/garicano/
00203.pdf. Thus, these data imply that 275,000 (or 62.6% of 440,000) lawyers work in law
offices of at least five lawyers. Using the 1998 Martindale data, we find that 272,000
lawyers work in law offices of at least five lawyers. Even if we assume that the number of
lawyers in law offices of this size grows by 10% over the six-year time period from 1992 to
1998 (the equivalent growth over the observed six-year period starting in 1998), the
Martindale data captures over 90% of all lawyers working at U.S. law offices of at least
five lawyers.
5. See The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directories: A Global Network for the Legal
Community, http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/Products/LawDirectories/Print/
law.directory.xml (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
6. In most of our analyses, we restrict our attention to firms with at least five lawyers.
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historical copy of the directory in electronic format, through 2004. 7
Because Martindale could not recover every historical quarter, there
are a few missing quarters. Table 1 lists all quarter-year combinations
for which we have data. Martindale provided us with the following
information on lawyers: name, law firm, office location, title, date of
birth, date of admission to the bar, location of admission, law school
name and graduation date, undergraduate school name and
graduation date, practice areas, and peer rating.'
We have the
following information on firms: name, establishment year, office
locations, main office, and practice areas.9 For firms with premium
listings, we also have biographies, profiles, and representative clients.
Martindale assigns every lawyer and firm a unique permanent
identification number ("ID"). Within each firm ID, offices are
assigned a unique ID number.
Table 1. Data Received from Martindale-Hubbell
Aggregated
Year-End

I

Included Quarters

1998

1997 01,1998 01

1999

1998 Q2,1998 Q4,1999 Q1

20001

1999 Q2, 1999 04, 2000 Q1

20011

2000 Q2, 2000 Q3, 2000 04, 2001 Q1

20022

2001 Q2, 2001 04, 2002 01

2003

2002 Q2, 2002 Q3, 2002 04, 2003 01

2004

2003 Q2, 2003 03, 2003 04, 2004 Q1

In 2000 and 2001 Martindale published two versions of the Q1 directory.
Martindale supplied us with identical data for Q4 2000 and Q3 2001 and patterns in the data
indicate that both quarters of data actually represent Q4 2000. Thus, we are not using Q3
2001 data.

2

7. We are limited to the data range from 1998 to 2004 because this is the only time
period for which electronic data is available. The large size of the directory prohibits data
entry from earlier print copies of the directory. See infra Part II for further discussion.
8. For an explanation of how Martindale calculates peer ratings, see MartindaleHubbell Peer Review Ratings, http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/About-Us/
Ratings/ratings-intro.xml (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
9. We have relied on Martindale's internal classification to separate academic,
corporate, and government listings from those law firms. Only a handful of firms appear
with more than one type of firm and we reassign these cases to a single firm type.
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Cleaning Up the Data
1. The Consistency of Firm, Lawyer, and Office IDs

Since the Martindale dataset was gathered to be used as a
directory, its primary structure is a cross-section rather than a panel.
In order to use the data as a panel, we check for and correct cases
where IDs are not longitudinally consistent."0 Our procedure for
doing so is detailed in the Appendix.
2. Elimination of Duplicates
Lawyers sometimes appear in the database more than once in a
quarter.
We eliminate these duplicates (using a procedure
documented in the Appendix) so that every lawyer appears at most
once per quarter. Missing quarterly entries are discussed below.
3. Assigning Lawyers to Positions
The title information provided by Martindale separates lawyers
across twenty-four different positions. Only a small fraction of firms
have no information on positions. Using information on the age
distributions by position, we standardize Martindale's titles into five
distinct categories: partners, associates, off-track attorneys, contract
attorneys, and retired attorneys.11
4. Aggregating Quarterly Data into Annual Data
For analyzing time trends, it is important to compare data from
year to year at the same point in time because the entry and exit of
lawyers varies by quarter. While it is possible to use only data from a
single quarter for each year, we instead annualize over all quarters in
a year so as not to leave out lawyers who may not list in Martindale in
every quarter. The major caveat of this method is that if a lawyer
10. A panel dataset follows a set of respondents over a period of time whereas a crosssectional dataset only considers respondents at one point in time. If IDs in different crosssections were longitudinally inconsistent (i.e., if a single lawyer is identified by more than
one ID over time), it would be impossible to track respondents through time.
11. The partners category includes the title partner as well as director, hiring partner,
junior partner, managing partner, marketing partner, member, principal, senior partner,
and shareholder. The associates category does not include any other variants of the title.
The off-track category includes lawyers with the following titles: attorney, associate
counsel, counsel, consultant, of counsel, senior attorney, senior counsel, and special
counsel. If a firm has associates but no partners, we code attorney and senior attorney as
partner. If a firm has neither associates nor partners, then we classify attorney as "no
distinction." Contract attorneys, employees, and staff attorneys make up the contract
attorneys category.
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exits the legal services industry before the last quarter in the year, we
will assign that lawyer to the last known firm he or she belongs to
and, therefore, year-end totals may include lawyers that have actually
exited earlier in the year. At worst, we delay exit by a maximum of
three quarters. We aggregate the data to end with the first quarter of
each year (see Aggregated Year-End Column in Table 1 for annual
assignment) because a first quarter year-end allows us to include all
available data. 2 Because we have only one quarter of data for the
year ending with Q1 1998, we count Q1 1997 in 1998. Including Q1
1997 helps to account for any lawyers that may have appeared in the
missing quarters (Q2, Q3, and Q4 1997) but do not appear in Q1
1998. Relative to all other years of data, we will at most retain
lawyers (who really exit the industry) for an extra three months. We
have at least three quarters of data in all years other than 1998.
For each year, we convert the quarterly records into a single
annual observation. If a lawyer's firm and position information does
not change during the year, then this task is trivial. When a lawyer's
firm (or position) changes, we use that lawyer's next and last firm
(position) to determine which firm (position) appears second in
chronological order. 3 In the event that a lawyer appears in more
than one firm (position) in the next or last year, then we order the
data chronologically and assign the lawyer to the second firm
(position). At the firm level, we keep the last known main office and
14
branch office addresses in each year.
C. Restrictions to the Sample
Based on our estimates, the Martindale dataset contains records
on about 950,000 lawyers per year working in law firms, as sole
practitioners, and for government, academic, and corporate
organizations globally. However, we are most interested in a subset
of these lawyers. In most of our analyses, we restrict the sample to
U.S. lawyers working in private practice firms of five or more lawyers.

12. If we were to use Q4 as the year-end, then we would have to throw away data
from Q1 1997 and Q1 2004 since we would have only one quarter of data for both of these
years.
13. This algorithm avoids any problems that might arise from inconsistencies in
reporting at a quarterly level-for example, if data are not updated linearly.
14. In cases where a firm has more than one office marked as the main office, we
apply an algorithm similar to the one described above for annualizing quarterly lawyer
information. If a firm has no offices marked as the main office, we assume the largest
office is the main office.
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1. Elimination of International Lawyers
Although Martindale maintains some data on lawyers globally,
we restrict our analysis to the U.S. legal market because we do not
have reason to believe that Martindale contains a census of
international lawyers. For the small fraction of lawyers listed in U.S.
and international offices in the same year, we must make an
assumption about which country they actually work in. Because firms
frequently list lawyers in multiple offices, we apply an algorithm
similar to that used in Part I.C.3 to eliminate duplicate office listings.
The simple intuition works as follows: if a firm lists all lawyers in the
main office, then we assume a lawyer listed in two offices in different
countries works in the nonmain office. Specifically, lawyers listed in
one U.S. and one foreign office work in the office that is not in their
home country (the international office, if the firm's main office is
located in the United States; the U.S. office, if the firm's main office is
located outside of the United States). Alternatively, some firms list
all lawyers in every office and, thus, we assume lawyers listed in more
than two offices work in the country where their firm is
headquartered.1 5
2. Elimination of Small Firms
We have chosen to eliminate the smallest firms from our analysis for
two reasons. First, because firms and lawyers choose to appear in the
Martindale directory, we are concerned that Martindale may not
represent a complete census of small firms. Smaller firms are more
likely to have localized demand and depend less on referrals, 'possibly
making even a free directory listing not worthwhile. Second, we are
concerned that the strategies, policies, and practices of law firms
(which are in the end the focus of our interest) may differ between
very small firms and larger firms. It may be that very small firms are
more like sole practitioners than they are like law firms.
By
eliminating the tiniest firms and sole practitioners, we rule out any
problems that might result from drawing conclusions about law firm
practices with data from organizations that are fundamentally
dissimilar. Specifically, we choose a minimum cutoff size of five or
more lawyers. Table 2 shows the number of lawyers in firms of all

15. If a lawyer is listed in one office in the home country and many offices abroad, we
assume he or she works in the non-home country. Given that these lawyers are selectively
listed in almost all non-home country offices (and no other home country offices), we
assume that they spend more of their time abroad.
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Table 2. Number of Lawyers
1998

1999

2000

2001

All lawyers

389,129

398,355

411,228

419,172

421,852

426,015

428,562

Lawyers in firms of5 or
more

278,917

284,729

293,992

300,967

301,758

306,055

307,507

Percent of all lawyers
Lawyers in firms of 5 or
more in top 10 cities

12002

2003

12004

72%

71%

71%

72%

72%

72%

72%

129,781

133,738

138,160

142,156

143,015

145,047

145,966

I

Percent of all lawyers

33%

34%

34%

34%

34%

34%

34%

Percent of all lawyers
in firms of 5 or more

47%

47%

47%

47%

47%

47%

47%

I

sizes and the number of lawyers in firms of size five or more over
time. The firms we exclude from our analysis account for a constant
fraction of lawyers, about 30%, in all years. This 30% is a large
number, and (because sole practitioners are less likely to list in
Martindale) is almost surely an underestimate of the number of
lawyers not included in our sample. It is thus important to recognize
that our analysis is not really representative of the entire legal
services industry, but rather that part of the market served by law
firms of five or more lawyers.
Our final dataset contains 2.1 million lawyer-year records and
110,000 firm-year records. Unless otherwise stated, all empirical
results from this point forward derive from lawyers working in private
practice firms of at least five attorneys.
3. Elimination of Duplicate Office Listings
Before we can calculate office size, we must assign lawyers to a
single office in each firm-year combination. It is not surprising that
firms may choose to list their lawyers in multiple offices since the
function of listing in Martindale is to advertise legal talent, and listing
in more than one place makes it easy to find lawyers. For example,
some firms list all lawyers in the main office and other firms list their
name partners in every office. Some of these lawyers may actually
split their time between offices, but because other duplicate listings
may be advertisements, we assume lawyers can only be in residence in
a single office. We first use a lawyer's own career history to resolve
16
instances where duplication results because lawyers change offices.
16. We rule out the possibility that one office ID folds into another by further
examining all cases where one office ID ends in a year and another begins in the same
year (but where the offices do not appear in the same quarter). If more than 75% of the

2006]

LEGA L SER VICES IND US TRY

1645

If a lawyer is listed in two offices in a year, but only one of those
offices in the following year, we assume next year's office is the
correct office for the current year. 17 Next, we apply an algorithm that
uses information about how many offices list a lawyer to assign the
remaining cases of duplication. 8 If a firm lists all lawyers in every (or
almost every) office, then knowing the selection of offices a lawyer is
listed in provides no additional information for assigning a lawyer to a
single office. In this case, we assign lawyers to the main office.
However, if a firm has many offices, but a lawyer is listed in only two
of those offices, we assume the firm follows a practice of listing all
lawyers in the main office and assigns such dually listed lawyers to the
branch office.
The assignment for cases where a lawyer is listed in both offices
of a firm that has only two offices is slightly more complicated. If a
firm has only two offices, we do not know whether lawyers are listed
in both offices because everyone is always listed in the main office (in
which case duplicate lawyers should be assigned to the branch office)
or because everyone is always listed in every office (in which case
duplicate lawyers should be assigned to the main office).19 We assign
lawyers who are listed in both offices (consistent with the assignment
of lawyers who are listed in every office above) to the main office
with a few exceptions. We call any office where office size equals
firm size the "equal" office.2" If only one office in a firm contains all
lawyers, we assume lawyers listed in both offices work in the office
that does not list every lawyer, or the "not equal" office.' If a firm
has only two offices and neither office size equals firm size, but one
office lists all partners in the firm, we assume lawyers listed in both
offices work in the office that does not list every partner. Although
lawyers in the closing office move to the new office, we treat these offices as if they were
the same. We also supplement this list with any cases where 75% of the duplicated
lawyers in an office move to another irrespective of first and last years for each office.
17. This method will also resolve cases where firms change their reporting patterns
over time-i.e., if a firm lists all lawyers in the main office in some, but not all, years.
18. We spot checked small samples of data to inform our algorithm.
19. This is not a problem when the firm has more than two offices, because we know
that if a lawyer is listed in only two of those offices, it is not the firm's policy to list every
lawyer in every office.
20. We actually allow a small window of flexibility to account for any small reporting
errors. We treat office size as if it equals firm size as long as the office contains at least
90% of the total number of lawyers in the firm or at least 80% of the total number of
lawyers in the firm if firm size is less than twenty lawyers.
21. In the event that both offices' sizes equal firm size, we assume lawyers work in the
main office. If we identify a partner as a name partner, meaning the partner's last name
matches part of the firm's name, then we always assume the lawyer works in the main
office.
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these steps may seem to add an extra layer of complication, in almost
every case the main office is the "equal" office and the branch office
is the "not equal" office, making this procedure identical to the basic
method detailed above. The key difference is that we refine our
procedure for two-office firms such that we assign a lawyer dually
listed in one office containing all lawyers to the branch office instead
of the main office.
4. Elimination of Demotions
There are a few instances in the dataset where lawyers appear to
move from partner to associate in the same firm. We assume these
are data errors, and that firms do not demote partners-that is,
lawyers do not move from the partner position to the associate
position while working at the same firm.22 Generally, we assume a
lawyer is an associate until the last year in which he or she appears as
an associate. For example, if a lawyer holds the positions associate,
associate, partner, associate, and partner in chronological order, we
change the position in year three from partner to associate. 23 We do
not assume the alternative, that a lawyer is a partner from the first
point in time that he or she is listed as a partner, because we find that
many instances of demotions are the product of firms that list all
lawyers as partners in one or two years, but separate associates from
partners in all other years. We do, however, allow for demotions
when lawyers move across firms because different firms may have
different partnership criteria. 4
D. Other Lawyer and Firm Characteristics

1. Lawyer Characteristics
Martindale records each lawyer's biographical characteristics,
including birth year and graduation year, on a quarterly basis even
22. We do allow lawyers to move from partner or associate to off-track as this may
happen when a lawyer takes a leave of absence but stays on the firm's books.
23, The lawyer's revised position list is then: associate, associate, associate, associate,
and partner.
24. "[P]artnership criterias [sic] include culture compatibility, personality, firm needs,
practice specialty, credentials, productivity, excellence, leadership, and popularity.... [I]t
is relatively harder to make partner at firms with higher profits and leverage." Neil
Soloman, Timing the Market, LEGAL Bus., June 17, 2002, at 18. Differences in these
criteria across firms are made most obvious in law firm dissolutions when lawyers give up
partner status to join new firms, as was the case when Proskauer Rose hired former Shea
& Gould partners as off-track lawyers, for example. See Vera Titunik, Stripped for Parts,
AM. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 68, 69-70.
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though this information should not change with time. Because
lawyers are sent versions of their current profiles to revise each year,
we eliminate inconsistencies in birth year by assuming the
information contained in the most recent directory is correct. If a
lawyer reports more than one law school graduation year, we assume
the graduation year that makes the lawyer closest to age twenty-five
at graduation is the correct one.25 We calculate age as the current
year minus birth year and years out of school as the current year
minus law school graduation year.
We only observe the occurrence of promotion for lawyers who
get promoted between 1998 and 2004. Ideally, we would like to know
how many years each lawyer worked at his or her current firm (and
prior firms) before promotion. However, our data are left-censored,
meaning that we have no information about the careers of lawyers
prior to 1998. Hence, it is not possible to track a lawyer from the
beginning of his or her career to the point of promotion. We can
calculate years to promotion as the length of time between a lawyer's
graduation from law school and year of promotion. This procedure is
consistent with practice in many firms, who calculate a lawyer's
"class" not by time at the firm, but by time out of school, including
clerkships, as years that count on the partnership clock.2 6
Martindale does not track gender for each lawyer, but we are still
able to construct a measure of gender using frequencies of names by
gender from the 1990 Census. 27 From the Census data, we calculate
for each name the percentage of people with that name who are
female. If the percentage of females is greater than 50% for a name,
then all lawyers with that name are coded as female.
If the
percentage of females is less than 50% for a name, then all lawyers
with that name are coded as male. For example, 3.1% of females and
25. If a lawyer lists more than one law school, both of which have a graduation year,
we first use degree information to select the most advanced law degree and assign any
remaining cases to the law school that appears more frequently. If years out of school are
less than zero in any year, we assume hat years out of school are missing.

26. For example, Jones Day grants credit for reasonable time spent in judicial
clerkships. See Jones Day, Judicial Clerks, http://www.jonesday.com/FCWSite/careers/
apply/clerks.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2006); Susman Godfrey, Attorney Recruiting Info,
http://www.susmangodfrey.com/recruit/recruit-philosophy.html
(last visited Apr. 15,

2006). Law school career services offices also indicate that many firms count a year in a
clerkship towards partnership. See TEX. TECH. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, CAREER SERVICES
CENTER HANDBOOK 2003-2004, at 4, available at http://www.law.ttu.edu/lawWeb/career
services/HANDBK2003-2004.pdf.
27. See Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Frequently Occurring First Names

and Surnames

from the

1990

Census,

names.html (last modified Mar. 17, 2005).

http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/freq
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3.6% of males are named Kerry, thus, 46% of people named Kerry
are female and all lawyers with the name Kerry are coded as male. 8
The Census only lists names accounting for 90% of the population, so
we use Baby Name Guesser, a web-based tool, to fill in the most
likely gender for any remaining names.29 There are about 1% of
lawyers for which we are unable to identify a gender, either because a
lawyer reports only his or her initials or the name is so rare that it
does not appear in either of our sources.
2. Firm Characteristics
We build firm statistics by aggregating up from the lawyer level.
Since we know each lawyer's office and firm, we can easily compute
office and firm size by counting the number of lawyers in each office
and firm. A multi-office firm has more than one populated office
location. If the office assignment procedure reduces the number of
lawyers in an office to zero, we do not include it in the firm's total
number of branch offices. We calculate leverage, a measure of a
firm's hierarchy, as the ratio of associates to partners. We measure
the size of a firm's geographic footprint as the smallest region that
contains all of a firm's offices.3 °
E. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the total number of lawyers reported in the
Martindale data over the time period starting in 1998 and ending in
2004. It also shows the number of lawyers working in firms of five
lawyers or more and the number of these lawyers in the top ten legal
markets. There is a slight upward trend in the total number of
lawyers during this period. Almost one-half of all lawyers working in
28. In cases where a lawyer has an unrecognized first name, we use the middle name
to identify a gender. If a lawyer's first name is female and middle name is male, we code
as female. In all of the cases we checked in this category, the middle name looked to be
the lawyer's maiden name. If a lawyer's first name is male and middle name is female, the
lawyer is coded as male unless the middle name is 100% female or the middle name is
greater than 75% female and the first name is at least a small fraction (5%) female. If a
lawyer reports multiple variants of his or her name that have conflicting genders, we
assume the gender that appears with greater frequency is correct.
29. See Geoff Peters, Baby Name Guesser, http://cgi.sfu.ca/-gpeters/cgi-bin/pear/
gender.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2006). Baby Name Guesser uses Google searching
techniques to assign a most likely gender. Id.
30. The Census divides states into four regions (Northeast, South, Midwest, and
West) and further subdivides each region into two to three subregions. Geography Div.,
U.S. Census Bureau, Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, http://www.
census.gov/geo/www/us-regdiv.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2006). We say a firm has a
national footprint if it has offices in all four census regions.
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firms of five or more work in the top ten legal markets (as ranked in
1998 by the number of lawyers working at firms headquartered in

each metropolitan statistical area ("MSA")), but the top ten markets
do not account for an increasingly greater fraction of lawyers over
time.31 Nor has there been very much change in the relative size of
the top ten legal markets. Figure 1 shows the actual population of
lawyers in each market. New York is the city with the most lawyers
and Washington, D.C. is second with about half as many lawyers in
our sample. Even though all markets are growing, no top ten city is
gaining disproportionately: there has been no change in the ranking
of market by size over this period.
Figure 1. Number of Lawyers by Top Ten City
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31. We rank legal markets using the number of lawyers by firm (or main office)
location rather than individual office location so that when we segment firm level
characteristics by city, we choose the MSAs that contain firms accounting for the highest
fraction of lawyers. Based on the Martindale data, the top ten legal markets in order of
lawyers by main office location are: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C.,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Boston, Dallas, Atlanta, and Houston. It is not surprising
that this ordering differs from that shown in Figure 1. Washington, D.C. likely has many
more lawyers who work there than lawyers whose firms are based there because the
proximity to government lawmakers may make it a relatively more attractive city for
branch offices. If we ranked the top ten legal markets in 2004 rather than 1998, Miami
would replace Houston on the list. If we ranked the top ten legal markets based on the
number of lawyers working in each of these cities, then Miami would replace Houston
regardless of whether we based our ranking on 1998 or 2004.
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Table 2 and Figures 2a and 2b together document a particular
pattern of industry consolidation. Though the number of lawyers is

growing, the number of firms is declining slightly. (See Figure 2a.)
Figure 2a. Number of Firms and Average Firm Size
17.000

16.000
20

15.000
18

14,000
16
13.000

14
12,000
of firms

MNumber

I 1,00o
0

12

firm size

1100--*--Average

10.000
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Figure 2b. Number of Offices and Average Office Size
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Thus, the average size of firms is growing. Figure 2b shows that the
number of law offices grew until 2000, and has been stable since then.
Therefore, firms are growing by starting, and especially acquiring,

new offices.
Tables 3a and 3b show that the addition of offices

is

accompanied by an increase in geographic diversification, showing
the number and percentage of lawyers by the size of firm footprints.
Firms with a national footprint account for 9% of lawyers in 2004, up
from only 4% in 1998. In spite of this trend, the market is still largely
local: over 45% of lawyers work at firms whose offices are all
contained in a single MSA, with 20% more working in firms with a
geographic reach no larger than a single Census subregion.
Table 3a. Number of Lawyers by Degree of National Presence

Presence
National

I 119

9oI2o

2o 1

1998

1999

2000

4 Region

11,808

12,433

16,572

3 Region

22,574

25,611

2 Region

36,822

38,283

1 Region

7,216

7,297

7,203

7,948

Subregional

17,314

18,285

18,858

19,878

State

31,091

31,709

32,778

33,897

MSA

152,092

151,111

151,148

Total

278,917

284,729

293,992

1 2001

o

2002

2003

2004

20,494

22,168

22,713

26,309

28,995

30,632

33,602

37,386

35,396

38,438

38,647

38,835

38,608

38,445

8,267

9,500

10,923

19,409

19,153

19,300

34,085

34,152

33,613

149,471

145,392

144,543

143,521

300,967

301,758

306,055

307,507

Table 3b. Percent of Lawyers by Degree of National Presence
National

98

1999

2000

4 Region

4.2%

4.4%

3 Region

8.1%

2 Region

13.2%

1 Region

2.6%

2.6%

J

2001

2002 1 2003

2004

5.6%

6.8%

7.3%

7.4%

8.6%

9.0%

9.9%

10.2%

11.1%

12.2%

11.5%

13.4%

13.1%

12.8%

12.9%

12.6%

12.5%

2.5%

2.6%

2.7%

3.1%

3.6%

6.6%

6.4%

6.3%

6.3%

Subregional

6.2%

6.4%

6.4%

State

11.1%

11.1%

11.1%

11.3%

11.3%

11.2%

10.9%

MSA

54.5%

53.1%

51.4%

49.7%

48.2%

47.2%

46.7%

Total

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%
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In 2004, the pool of lawyers is still predominantly male, with
women increasing as a fraction of all lawyers from 23% to only 26%
over the seven-year time period.32 (See Table 4.) However, the
percentage of women among all lawyers is not representative of the
current level of gender equality because the existing stock of lawyers
is mostly male. We instead calculate the percentage of women among
the flow of entrants into the profession. We find that women have
made significant inroads, increasing from 40% of all first year
associates in 1998 to 47% by 2004."3
II. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Since this is the first study of the legal services industry using the
entire Martindale directory, our primary research approach is to let
the data tell the story of the industry from within rather than
imposing (and testing for) a specific hypothesis ex ante. In the results
that follow in Part III below, we present a series of descriptive
statistics that document changes in the industry that may have been
brought on by the decline in relationship lawyering. Since we are
essentially using a census, we have the opportunity to compare our
results with conventional wisdom derived from anecdotes, theories, or
small sample analysis.
Table 4. Percent of Female Lawyers
11998

1999 12000 1 2001

2002

2003

j2004_

All lawyers

23.1%

23.7%

24.3%

25.0%

25.4%

25.9%

26.3%

First-year associates

40.2%

39.8%

42.1%

43.8%

44.6%

45.4%

47.1%

32. We exclude the approximately 1% of lawyers for whom we cannot identify a
gender, see supra Part I.D.1, from this analysis.
33. The fact that entry into the legal services market is just under 50% female is also a
reassuring indicator that our measure of gender is not terribly inaccurate. Our entry
estimates are also consistent with graduation rates reported by the American Bar
Association. See Am. Bar Ass'n, J.D. Degrees 1984-2004, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/
statistics/jd.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2006). The percent of women graduating from law
school has increased from 44% to 49% over the same time period. Id. The small
differences from our numbers can be explained if our gender assignment makes more
mistakes in identifying names that are actually female than male. This might occur if
females are more likely to be given gender neutral or male names than males are likely to
be given female names. These differences can also be explained if women are less likely
than men to enter a law firm straight out of law school (or at all).
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An advantage of our data is that we are working with the entire
population of lawyers and not drawing inferences from a sample.
Ordinarily, empirical research focuses on finding statistically
significant differences, attempting to show that a difference in the
observed sample is indicative of a difference in the population. But,
when we observe a change in a variable over time, we know that this
change is the actual difference in the population. For this reason, we
almost never report standard errors or statistical significance levels in
this Article.3 4 Our burden is instead to identify whether and where
there have been interesting or significant changes in the industry.
We describe each variable of interest using some combination of
totals, means, medians, and distributions.
Means (and other
measures of central tendency) can be misleading indicators when the
underlying distribution is not symmetric, has more than one peak, or
is changing over time. For this reason, we will often try to present
results that show the entire distribution of the data, allowing for a
fuller analysis of the underlying phenomena.
A serious shortcoming of our data is their short time span. While
the Martindale directory has been published for over one hundred
years in printed form, the company has only kept its historical files in
(incomplete) database form since 1997. For this reason, we have data
only beginning in 1998. Clearly, many of the changes that we
examine in this Article occurred much longer ago than this, and so
many of the trends that we document have been going on for much
longer as well. To the extent that we discern changes in the structure
of the industry, of firms, or of careers over this short time frame, we
believe that it is even more powerful evidence of important changes
occurring in the legal profession, over a longer time period.
However, failure to find changes over this shorter time period must
be viewed with skepticism.
III. ANALYZING THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES
A.

Effects of the Decline of Relationship Lawyering

In this Part, we analyze four trends in the legal industry: the
changing distribution of firm sizes; the rise of multi-office,

34. Our sample size is so large that virtually all of the differences that we report would
be statistically significant if we were to calculate such measures.
35. In some cases, we segment our analysis by subgroups of firms. Disaggregating the
data can be helpful in drawing more accurate conclusions to the extent that differences in
variation by firm characteristics confound aggregate results.
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geographically-dispersed firms; increasing leverage in law firms; and
changes in the nature of legal careers, particularly the lengthening of
the partnership "clock" and a possible decline in the use of "up-orout" promotion systems. We argue that all of these trends may be
linked to the changing nature of the relationship between law firms
and their clients.
Over the past quarter century, much has been made of the rise of
the in-house counsel and the resulting demise of "relationship
lawyering." Corporate legal departments have exhibited significant

growth since the early 1980s and have continued this trend in recent
years.36 Between 1998 and 2004, the 200 largest in-house legal
departments grew from a total of 24,000 to 27,500 lawyers.37 Armed

with more talent and the goal of cutting costs, corporate law
departments are performing an increasing share of legal work inhouse.38 General counsel surveyed in 1998 did not anticipate sending
more work to outside law firms in the coming year, despite a belief
that the volume of legal work would increase.3 9 Cost pressures are
also leading corporate counsel to reduce the number of outside law

firms they use.4 °
One consequence of the increasing size and scope of in-house
legal departments has been that corporate clients no longer hire a law
firm to "be their lawyer," developing a multifaceted and lasting
relationship and giving that firm virtually 100% of their legal work.41
36. Galanter and Palay document an increase in the size of corporate law departments
from 1979 to 1987. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 131-38 (1991); see also
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:

FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 276 (1993) (emphasizing "the growing size and sophistication of the in-house
law departments that many corporations now possess"); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS
WITH POWER:

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 57 (1988)

(stating that "[tihe movement to internalize legal work has made corporate legal
departments, not law firms, the fastest growing segment of the legal profession").
37. This statistic was found by totaling all lawyers working globally in corporate legal
departments on the Corporate Legal Times 200 Largest Legal Departments list. See The
200 Largest Legal Departments, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2005, available at http:/
www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/pdfs/The200Largest.pdf.
The number of
lawyers in the top 200 legal departments has remained a constant fraction of lawyers in
our sample.
38. See Bruce Rubenstein, In-House Stronger, More Cost-Effective, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 1998, at 1.
39. See Bruce Rubenstein, Law Departments Will Do More with Less, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, July 1998, at 1.
40. See Amy I. Stickel, FourthAnnual Report of Corporate Law Departments, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, May 2001, at 1.

41. Pollock details the demise of the longstanding relationship between Milbank,
Tweed and Chase Manhattan Bank. "[R]outine legal work that firms like Milbank had
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Because corporate clients now do much of their routine legal work inhouse, they are more likely to hire outside firms only for large,
complex, or specialized matters. These firms are often hired for a
specific transaction and corporate clients seek to hire the most
capable lawyer for each case.4 2 "[I]ncreasingly, clients view their legal
counsel as a commodity that can be purchased from a number of
sources" and often "shop" their work through a competitive selection
process to a broader set of firms.43 Longstanding relationships
between clients and firms have been replaced by a transactional
system where clients hire individual lawyers, not law firms."
In response to these changes, firms face two possible strategies to
compete. As detailed below, they can either expand in terms of size
and service offerings, or they can specialize. Lost in this dynamic is
the traditional midsized, general practice firm-the demise of which
has been predicted for years.4 5 In the analysis in Part III.B below, we
look for this decline and find only modest evidence of this trend.
Another way that firms can compete with larger in-house legal
departments is to increase their geographic diversity. It is unlikely
that in-house corporate legal departments can build sufficient
expertise in multiple jurisdictions. Thus, firms that can offer this type
of expertise will be able to offer clients value. We document the
increasing geographic diversity of law firms in Part III.C.
As old relationships become less important, law firms (and
lawyers) now must compete against each other for clients in a way
that would have been unimaginable in the past. Rather than relying
on competent legal expertise and loyalty to the firm to maintain
thrived on was increasingly taken over by in-house counsel-staff lawyers hired by
companies to do the work more efficiently and at a lower cost." ELLEN JOAN POLLOCK,
TURKS AND BRAHMINS: UPHEAVAL AT MILBANK, TWEED 13 (1990). "Milbank found

itself competing with Chase's staff lawyers and with other firms, even in New York." Id.
at 123.
42. Lisa Haueisen Rohrer, Mergers in Professional Service Firms: A Large-Scale
Analysis of How Law Firm Mergers Shape Attorney Careers and the Use and Retention
of Human Capital ch. 2 (June 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Business
School, on file with authors).
43. John S. Lipsey, Shift in Focus: Keeping Clients Happy, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001,
at B20.
44. Roger H. Marks, General Counsel and Secretary of H 20 + (a consumer products
company) notes that "[w]hen we seek outside counsel, the law firm in many cases becomes
secondary. We often look for an attorney who has good judgment, who can aggressively
represent our interests and who has creative solutions." The Client Speaks, ILL. LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 1999, at 1; see also Jawboning Key To Managing Outside Lawyers: Lateral
Hires Are a Two Way Street Now, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1993, at 1.
45. See Jerry Sears, Making Rain, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2001, at 8; Steven Brill,
The Law Business in the Year 2000, AM. LAW., June 1989, at 5.
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clients, partners must actively seek out new clients.46 Rainmaking is
now a necessary tool for a law firm's performance and survival. "As a
result, firms-more than ever before-are grappling with how to
teach their associates and new partners to be good marketers as well
as good lawyers."4 7
The increased importance of business-getting changes several
aspects of legal practice, legal careers, and the structure of law firms.
Since the senior members of the firm must spend more of their time
getting business, they have less time to actually do the legal work.4 8
This implies that having more associates per partner may be an
optimal response to this change in the nature of the legal profession.49
We document this trend in Part III.D.
There is another implication of the increased importance of
rainmaking to law firms. Associates now must do more than simply
show that they are "good lawyers"; they must show they are good
business generators if they are to be promoted to partner. This may
imply the need to lengthen the amount of time before an associate is
elevated to partner. In addition, firms finding that associates are
more valuable as associates, but less valuable as partners, may reduce
their use of up-or-out systems to keep associates at the firm for longer
periods. In Part III.E, we examine changes in promotion rates and
systems. We find evidence that promotion clocks are lengthening,
and mixed evidence of the reduced reliance on up-or-out career
systems.
B.

Firm Size

With the expansion of corporate legal departments, the type of
work referred to outside law firms has changed and the degree of cost
competition has increased. Corporate clients use law firms when they
need capacity or additional expertise, as may be necessary in
complicated, multidisciplinary, or specialized work.
Given the
increased competition for business, law firms are altering their scale
and scope to best meet the demands of clients.

46. Sears, supra note 45.
47. Scott Brede, Rainmakers Pave the Way for Next Generation, CONN. L. TRIB., Apr.
12, 1999, at 5.
48. See Chris Klein, Big-Firm Partners: Profession Sinking, NAT'L L.J., May 26, 1997,
at Al; Hal Mattern, TV's Pitchmen in PinstripeSuits, ARIz. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Nov. 27,
2005, at 1D; Felice C. Wagner, Rainmaking Secrets, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 4,2002, at 20.
49. It also implies the increase in the prevalence of "income partners" documented
elsewhere in this Issue. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier
Versus Two-Tier Partnershipsin the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1694-98 (2006).
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A growth strategy is one means of both solidifying existing client
relationships and developing new ones. First, by increasing in size,
law firms can meet the capacity needs of corporate clients. Second,
by increasing scope, or adding complementary practice specialties,
law firms can represent clients in transactional matters requiring legal
expertise in several areas."0 Firms adding scale in every practice area
can offer their clients "one-stop shopping," which may build ties to
the firm lasting longer than a single legal matter through active crossselling. Purchasing all legal services from a single firm for a
multidisciplinary matter may also be less costly than purchasing these
services A la carte from different law firms. Because these moves help
to protect client bases, they also keep the most powerful rainmakers
(and highest revenue generating partners) from looking for new firms
with greater scale or scope.
However, firms need not necessarily get bigger in order to
survive. With the demise of relationship lawyering, corporate counsel
are inclined to hire the best firm for a specific and likely specialized
matter. Boutique firms succeed because they offer highly-specialized
and narrowly-focused expertise without the high overhead costs
associated with many large firms.
While growth and the expansion-or alternatively reduction-of
practice areas are consistent responses of law firms to the competition
for clients and the increasingly specialized nature of legal work, firms
that do not adapt risk failure. Whereas midsize general practice firms
would have satisfied the routine legal needs of clients in the
relationship model, they are hard pressed to compete against firms
that offer more depth in each practice area in the transactional
model.5 1 Midsized firms are also more likely to be victims of poaching
and exit inertia:
With the proliferation of rapidly growing branch offices and the
expansion of existing large firms, rainmakers have an everincreasing number of lucrative career alternatives.
A
rainmaker at a midsize firm who now labors under the
knowledge that his or her compensation is substantially less
than market value and that he or she is, in effect, losing
hundreds of thousands of dollars by remaining with the firm,
will be hard-pressed to stay. The loss of rainmakers has serious
50. We assume firms increasing scope are doing so by hiring new lawyers. If firms are
increasing scope by having existing lawyers specialize, we would be unable to identify this
change vis-A-vis a change in firm size.
51. Krysten Crawford, Caught in the Middle, N.J. L.J., June 22, 1998, at 31.
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consequences beyond the loss of business itself.... [T]he loss
of key rainmakers undermines the firm's ability to recruit
52
replacements.
The departure of high revenue generating partners will make it even
more difficult for midsize firms to attract and maintain clients and
lawyers, potentially leading to more departures and eventual
dissolution.
In order to identify whether there has been a shakeout of
midsized firms, we calculate the distribution of lawyers by firm size.
We weight our analysis by lawyers because the largest 15% of firms
account for about 60% of lawyers. A lawyer-weighted statistic
measures the relative dominance of firm size categories in terms of
their share of the legal labor market. Tracking the percentage of
lawyers rather than firms also allows us to capture both the addition
(or deletion) of firms to a size bucket and the continued growth (or
decline) of the firms already in that bucket.
As a baseline, we create firm size deciles, setting the minimum
and maximum firm size for a decile such that each decile includes
roughly 10% of all lawyers in 1998."3 In Figure 3, the thick black line
at 10% indicates the desired baseline value for each size decile. Most
deciles in 1998 are very close to or slightly less than 10%. Only the
first two deciles contain more than 10% of lawyers. The lumpiness in
the distribution occurs in the smallest firm sizes because each decile
contains relatively few different firm sizes and many firms per size. If
we were to, for instance, make the smallest decile those firms with
five lawyers (instead of five to six lawyers), this bucket would contain
many fewer than 10% of all lawyers.

52. June Eichbaum et al., Midsize Firms Vie for Rainmakers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19,
1990, at 24.

53. Starting from the smallest firms, we group firm sizes together until they count for
a cumulative percent of lawyers as close to 10% as possible. We adjust the 10% target in
each next decile to an equal share of the remaining total percent of lawyers in order to

account for the possibility that a decile may not exactly equal 10% of lawyers.

For

example, if decile 1 contains 11% of lawyers, then we set firm sizes in decile 2 such that the
percent of lawyers is closest to (100%-11%)/9 or 9.89%. We repeat for this algorithm
starting with the largest firms and choose the decile set that minimizes the sum of the

squared differences for each decile from 10%. We do not split equally-sized firms across
buckets because the number of firms in each decile and number of lawyers at those firms
changes over time. Tracking lawyers from a single firm size in two different buckets would
only add an extra layer of complication and make the interpretation of our results more
difficult. We calculate deciles as a function of the percent of lawyers rather than the

number of lawyers because the size of the industry is growing as a whole and a percentage
based calculation enables us to capture the relative growth (or decline) by size decile.
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Figure 3. Percent of Lawyers by Size Decile in 1998 and 2004
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If it were true that midsized is no longer a sustainable firm size,
we would observe growth over time in the tails of the distribution and
a decline in the middle of the distribution such that the new
distribution would be U-shaped relative to the 1998 distribution. A
U-shaped distribution implies that more lawyers either work for large
firms or for small firms in 2004 than in 1998. The distribution of
lawyers by firm size in 2004 (see Figure 3) indicates that this is not the
case. It is true that there has been substantial growth in the largest
firms. Firms with 389 or more lawyers account for slightly less than
10% of lawyers in 1998, but over 18% of lawyers in 2004. Thus, the
largest firms are growing, perhaps in response to the need to offer
clients the capacity and the collection of practice areas needed for
complex, multidisciplinary legal work. We see no evidence, however,
of a corresponding rise in small firms or a larger decline in midsized
firms. In fact, it appears that the largest firms have grown at the
expense of firms of all other sizes. Figure 4a displays the net change
in the percentage of lawyers by firm size, or the difference between
the distribution of lawyers in 2004 and 1998 as shown in Figure 3.
From this viewpoint, it is again apparent that a higher percentage of
lawyers work at the largest firms, but also that the losses at midsized
firms do not account for relatively more of the decline.
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Figure 4. Net Change in Percent of Lawyers

Figure 4b. Top 10 Cities

Figure 4a. All Firms
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Before we can rule out a decline in the midsized firm, we must
reconsider our definition of midsized. The analysis above aggregates
firms nationally and effectively assumes that similarly sized firms are
the same, irrespective of their size, relative to other firms in their
local markets. So, the largest firm in Boise, Idaho may be lumped
together with a midsized firm in New York, potentially clouding
aggregate results. If the market for legal services is more local in
nature or is at least more local for midsized firms, then an analysis by
market allows the definition of a midsized firm to vary by location.
We repeat the size distribution analysis limiting the data to the top
ten legal markets. We use the same size deciles as before, but instead
calculate the fraction of lawyers in the top ten markets working at
firms in each decile. Since size is a firm-level characteristic, we
include all lawyers working at firms headquartered in the top ten
legal markets even if the lawyer actually works outside of the top ten
markets. We find some evidence (in Figure 4b) that firms in the
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middle of the distribution are exiting (at least relative to the smallest
firms), but there is still no obvious growth in smaller firms.
Even looking at only the top ten legal markets, the fact that we
do not observe an increase in small firms could still be a result of
aggregation. What counts as a small firm in Houston may differ from
what is considered small in Boston. And certainly this is true for New
York. We calculate the net change in the percentage of lawyers by
size decile for each of the top ten legal markets. In Figures 4c and 4d,
we present only the results for New York and San Francisco. (We
present the data for all ten markets in tabular form in Table 5.) We
find an even more pronounced decline of the midsized firm and now
see some growth in smaller firms. This is especially true in San
Francisco, where the boom in boutique firms serving start-ups and
practicing intellectual property law may show up in the data as
growth in most of the smallest five deciles 4 The results are similar
Table 5. Net Change in Percentage of Lawyers by Top Ten City

Q0

.E

--

o

z

1

5-6

-0.8

-1.6

-0.5

0.1

0.1

-1.0

-0.8

-2.9

1.6

-2.4

2

7-9

-0.1

-3.0

-0.4

-1.3

-3.7

-1.0

-1.7

-1.3

0.3

-2.1

3

10-13

-0.7

-2.3

-2.7

-0.5

-0.3

2.2

-1.8

-1.3

-0.9

-1.8

4

14-20

-1.0

-0.6

-1.8

0.2

-1.6

-2.8

-0.3

-1.9

1.0

-2.9

5

21-33

-0.4

-2.3

0.2

-0.1

0.6

2.3

-1.0

-1.8

1.3

-2.0

6

34-61

-1.5

-1.4

0.6

-2.6

-1.4

-2.5

-2.9

-0.9

-0.2

-3.2

7

62-117

-2.1

-1.1

-1.9

-2.2

0.0

-1.0

-0.3

-1.3

-2.6

2.3

8

118-224

0.2

-0.2

-5.5

-1.1

-7.4

-5.9

0.0

-5.1

-0.9

-4.3

9

225-388

-4.7

-3.0

-4.4

0.1

2.4

-2.8

2.5

-6.8

-4.0

-7.1

10

389+

11.1

15.3

16.5

7.4

11.4

12.5

6.2

23.2

4.4

23.5

54. The same pattern holds in Boston, where the biotech boom is likely to have a
large impact, but to a slightly lesser extent.
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when looking at the remaining top legal markets, though not all
markets exhibit growth of smaller firms.
C. GeographicDiversification
In addition to increasing their practice area scope, firms may also
increase their geographic scope (and regional expertise) as another
means of filling a void in in-house capabilities. As business is
increasingly more global (and certainly more national), having offices
located across the country enables law firms to offer representation in
geographic areas where corporate counsel are less familiar with local
laws. A large regional presence also may help law firms maintain
client relationships as corporate counsel push not only to hire the best
firm for a transaction, but also to reduce excessive legal costs
associated with hiring a different team of lawyers in every geographic
locale.
The observed growth of the largest firms is not inconsistent with
an expansion of geographic locations, since firms can grow both by
adding lawyers within their existing network of offices or by
extending their network (e.g., by opening or acquiring new offices).
Over this period, average firm size grew by 13%, while average office
size grew by only 6%. Since office size is not increasing by as much as
firm size, it must be the case that law firms are adding new offices to
their network. An increase in the total number of law offices over
time with a decrease in the number of law firms (see Figures 2a and
2b) implies that the number of branches per firm must have increased
on average. However, the average (unweighted) number of branches
per firm has only increased fractionally over the past seven years.
(See Figure 5.) This average is misleading because although multioffice firms account for just 20% of firms in 2004, almost 60% of
lawyers work at multi-office firms. An average that weights the
number of branches per firm by the number of lawyers who work at
each firm instead represents the number of branches in the average
lawyer's firm. Hence, the average number of branches per firm is 1.3
in 1998, but the average lawyer works at a firm with 2.8 branches. As
we can clearly see in Figure 5, the average lawyer works at a firm with
increasingly more offices over time.
We calculate the distribution of lawyers by the number of branch
offices per firm in Figure 6a.55 In 1998, 50% of lawyers work in multi55. We perform the same analysis using a firm's original number of offices, including
offices that may have zero lawyers after eliminating duplicate office assignments. The
results are similar to those based on the number of "populated" offices.
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Figure 5. Average Number of Offices per Firm
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office firms and over time the percentage of lawyers working at firms
with at least five offices has increased. By 2004, 57% of lawyers work
in multi-office firms and over 10% of lawyers work at firms with ten
or more offices. More lawyers work for the law firms with the most
offices, another indication that firms are adding scale in every
geographic area in order to better compete for corporate clients.
Figure 6b repeats the branch distribution analysis for firms based in
the top ten legal markets. Firms with the most offices gain an even
higher percentage of lawyers relative to firms with less than ten
offices than compared to the analysis including all cities. For almost
every possible number of branches per multi-office firm, a higher
percentage of lawyers in the top ten cities work at those firms than
compared with the same distribution for all cities. Thus, geographic
expansion is especially prevalent for firms most likely to be serving
the needs of global corporations.
D. Leverage
With the demise of longstanding client relationships, partners are
spending an increasingly larger fraction of their time generating
business. As a direct result, law firms need more lawyers to spend
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Figure 6a. Percent of All Lawyers by Number of Offices
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time doing legal work. Not wanting to dilute the rainmakers'
earnings, which may result in the loss of business-finders, firms are
likely to add business-minders at a nonpartner level. With the
addition of associates and a constant number of partners, leverage
will increase. However, the increased emphasis on rainmaking and
number of competitors competing for the partnership "prize" reduces
the likelihood that associates are promoted.56 A smaller expected
prize may discourage associates from working long billable hours and,
as a result, firms may have to increase leverage even more to
counteract a reduction in hours per associate. 7
Increased leverage may not only be a consequence of increased
rainmaking. A high leverage ratio ensures that firms have a supply of
relatively cheap labor to meet the short-term capacity needs of large
clients. Optimal leverage is also connected to the level of complexity
and specific specialty of the legal work.58
We calculate the average leverage ratio of all firms and firms
based in the top ten legal markets. We exclude in our analysis of
leverage those firms for which leverage is zero in every year. A zero
value of leverage implies that a firm consists of all partners and no
associates. This may either occur because a firm really has no
associates or because the firm chooses to only list its partners in
Martindale. Many smaller firms likely have no associates, but this is
less plausible for larger firms. If a firm ever lists associates, we
assume that in a year where that firm does not have associates, it is
the case that they really do not have associates and not that they
choose not to list their associates. 9 If a firm never has associates, we
cannot differentiate between the two possible explanations, and we
err conservatively by omitting all firms in question from our
analysis. 6 Table 6 shows that both the average leverage for all firms
and firms based in the top ten legal markets move in tandem, but the
average leverage for firms in the top ten cities is higher than the
56. See infra Part III.E.
57. See Henderson, supra note 49, at 1727-29.
58. DAVID MAISTER, MANAGING THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRM 4-9 (1993).

59. We implicitly assume that firms do not change their listing policies. We check
firms in deciles 6 and higher by hand and omit any firms where this is not the case.
60. For example, Cravath, Swaine & Moore has about 90 partners and over 300
associates, but lists only its partners and off-track attorneys in the Martindale directory.
Although Cravath is quite large, almost all of the omitted firms are much smaller in size.
Only 2% of firms in deciles five and higher are omitted. Overall, only 15% of firms are
omitted; the implication of these omissions, if firms actually contain zero associates (as
might be expected in the smallest firm sizes), is that we overstate the level of leverage for
the smallest size deciles. Provided that the number of these firms does not vary
significantly over time, their omission should have little impact on the trends.
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leverage for all firms. Median leverage is less than the mean leverage.
(See Table 6.)
The value of average leverage seems surprisingly low. One
explanation is that our definition of a partner is based on what firms
report to Martindale, which likely includes both equity and nonequity
partners. It would not be surprising if firms add lawyers to do legal
work at the nonequity partner level. Nonequity partners have
significant experience useful for representing clients in complicated
legal matters, but do not dilute the earnings of the highest revenue
earning equity partners. According to the chairman of Duane Morris,
"nonequity partners fill a very important role at a firm. You need
business generators, but you also need people to do the work. '61 To
the extent that firms use nonequity partners as an additional form of
leverage, leverage is higher than indicated in our analysis. In
addition, if the use of nonequity partners is increasing over time, as
suggested by Henderson, then we understate the increase in leverage
that may be occurring. 62 We have also omitted off-tracks, a title that
was historically reserved for semiretired partners but is increasingly
being given to permanent associates, from our leverage calculation.
This omission also leads us to underestimate the level and any
increasing trend in leverage.
We segment our analysis by size decile to test whether larger
firms are indeed more leveraged and determine whether the
increasing trend in leverage results directly from the increase in
Table 6. Average and Median Leverage
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003 ]2004

All firms

0.82

0.84

0.87

0.89

0.89

0.92

0.95

Top 10 cities

1.06

1.07

1.10

1.10

1.10

1.13

1.17

All firms

0.50

0.55

0.57

0.60

0.60

0.60

0.63

Top 10 cities

0.73

0.75

0.75

0.75

0.75

0.76

0.80

Average leverage

Median leverage

61. Jeff Blumenthal, Bitter Medicine: Law Firms in a Squeeze Increasingly Take
Difficult Step of Turning Equity Partnersinto Nonequity Partners,BROWARD DAILY Bus.

REV. (S. Fla.), Dec. 9, 2002, at A9.
62. See Henderson, supra note 49 at 1695-96; see also Edward H. Wesemann, The
Nonequity Tier, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at 40 ("Nonequity partnerships have become
increasingly popular with law firms as an alternative partnership tier.").
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lawyers working at large firms. We present results for both the means
and the medians since there are several large leverage outliers in the
middle size deciles. (In Figure 7a, the average leverage in decile
seven jumps in 2001 because a single highly-leveraged firm has two
Figure 7a. Average Leverage by Size Decile
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Figure 7b. Median Leverage by Size Decile
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partners in 2000 and only one partner in 2001, thus doubling its
leverage.) As both Figures 7a and 7b show, leverage is higher at
larger firms, increasing almost monotonically across the size range.
However, leverage appears to be increasing through time in the
small- and medium- sized firms, but not in the largest firms. This
pattern is not entirely consistent with the argument that the
increasing demand on senior lawyers to bring in new clients is forcing
firms to hire more junior-level lawyers. If this was the reason, we
would expect to see at least as much increase in leverage at the large
firms as at the small.
We also segment our analysis of leverage by firm types in order
to separate law firms by the kinds of clients they might serve. (See
Table 7.) Firms that have an office (including branch offices) in New
York are more leveraged on average than firms without a New York
office. Multi-office firms are also more leveraged on average than
firms with only a single office.63 To some extent, this may be true
because firms with a New York office or multiple offices are more
likely to be larger and the largest firms are the most leveraged.
In order to disentangle the effects of size, location, and structure
from the time trend in leverage, we perform multiple regression
analysis attempting to explain leverage ratios in our firms. We run
the following regression:
Leverage = a + 03,(NYC office) + ,(r(multi-office) + O3,(year) + Xp(size decile dummies).

The results of this analysis (presented in Table 8) indicate that some
of the results shown in Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 7a and 7b continue
to hold, while others do not. There is a highly significant time trend
of increasing leverage. Firms with New York offices are more
leveraged, as are multi-office firms. However, the multiple regression
Table 7. Average Leverage by Firm Type
1998

J

1999

2000

[ 2001

2002

]

2003

J

2004

All Firms

0.82

0.84

0.87

0.89

0.89

0.92

0.95

Single-Office Firm

0.79

0.81

0.83

0.85

0.84

0.88

0.92

Multi-Office Firm

0.93

0.97

1.03

1.06

1.09

1.11

1.07

No NYC Office

0.78

0.80

0.83

0.85

0.85

0.89

0.92

NYC Office

1.11

1.14

1.15

1.19

1.15

1.17

1.16

63. The same relationship holds for median leverage.
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Table 8. Leverage Regression (Dependent Variable = Leverage)
Independent Variables

Coefficient

Standard Error

NYC Office

0.282**

0.0130

Multi-Office

0.119**

0.0120

Year

0.020*

0.0021

Size Decile 2

0.093**

0.0112

Size Decile 3

0.200**

0.0129

Size Decile 4

0.186**

0.0142

Size Decile 5

0.146**

0.0168

Size Decile 6

0.149**

0.0220

Size Decile 7

0.200**

0.0293

Size Decile 8

0.033

0.0394

Size Decile 9

0.135*

0.0531

Size Decile 10

0.311**

0.0591

Constant
2

R
Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Statistically significant at the 5% level.

-40.011

4.1440
0.0132

**
*

results indicate that, after controlling for the effects of New York City
and multiple offices, the smallest and the largest firms are more
leveraged than are midsized firms. The leverage of firms in the eighth
and ninth deciles is almost always lower than that in smaller firms.
Although the overall increase in leverage is broadly consistent
with a trend towards greater division of labor between senior and
junior lawyers, and an accompanying need to hire more junior
lawyers, some of the patterns (particularly looking across firms of
different sizes) are not consistent with this story.
E.

Legal Careers

As the importance of soliciting business increases for partners in
law firms, current partners may find it more difficult to make new
partner decisions. When clients were tied to firms by history and a
network of relationships, a young lawyer could succeed in his or her
career by simply serving the specific needs of one or a small number
of clients: this was grounds enough for promotion. However, since
clients are now more likely to shift firms, associates must prove that
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they can also develop business if they are to be promoted to partner.
Law firms are reluctant to admit new partners unable to generate
business because rainmakers are highly mobile and any dilution of
partner earnings might cause important partners to depart. 64 In
response to this difficulty, firms may extend the promotion track to
allow more time for associate evaluation and decrease the likelihood
of making promotion mistakes that might dilute earnings.65 Firms are
effectively lengthening the promotion clock to full partner by creating
permanent nonpartner positions: through the addition of nonequity
partnership tiers, reducing the use of up-or-out promotion policies, or
creating off-track positions.66 Since the jobs of associate and partner
are now more different, moves that aim to keep associates at the firm,
in any capacity, are also consistent with the need for more lawyers to
do actual legal work.
Two-tier partnerships enable firms to
distinguish between promising newcomers and senior
rainmakers .... [F]irms can test out these prospective equity
partners and reap the benefit of the thousands of hours per year
that these ambitious young lawyers bill. Their advance to the
more prestigious level of senior partnership ... will depend on
their legal skills and their ability to generate business.67
As we have already stated above, the Martindale data does not
enable us to distinguish equity partners from nonequity ones, but the
increase in the number of two-tier partnerships is well-documented.68
The Martindale data does allow us, however, to measure the timing of
promotions and to examine whether firms are relying on up-or-out
promotion systems.
Table 9 shows that, despite an increasing number of associates,
the number of promotions has not increased.69 Since the number of
associates is increasing during this time period, the percentage of
associates promoted must have decreased. Table 9 shows that years
to promotion have increased over the same time period from an
64. See Eichbaum et al., supra note 52; see also Susan Beck, Gibson, Dunn's Tough
Cut, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 82, 85-86 (citing fear of decreased profit share as one
reason why many associates did not make partner).
65. Mitch Moxley, PartnershipTrack Gets Longer, NAT'L POST (Toronto), May 19,
2004, at FP9.
66. Longer promotion clocks are also consistent with the need for increased leverage.
67. Carrie Johnson, The Slow Demise of 'Up or Out', N.J. L.J., Jan. 26,1998, at 29.

68. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
69. The number of promotions in 1998 is the number of lawyers who are promoted
between 1998 and 1999.
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Table 9. Promotion Statistics
1998

1999 I2000

200 1

2002

[2003

Number of promotions

6,739

7,265

6,881

5,265

5,829

6,079

Promotion rate

6.7%

6.9%

6.3%

4.6%

5.0%

5.2%

Average years to promotion

9.13

9.13

9.28

9.59

9.64

9.65

average of 9.1 to 9.6 years. 7 A longer time to promotion is consistent
with the fact that "associates need more time to hone rainmaking and
practice skill."'" The average time to promotion is increasing across
all size deciles, but is slightly longer at the smallest firms than the
largest firms. Perhaps this results because lawyers who fail to make
partner at the largest firms move laterally to smaller firms where they
attempt to make partner again. These new firms likely evaluate
associates' abilities in their own firm for several more years before
making a partnership decision. Table 10 suggests that partnership
clocks are also affected by the firm's market: the average time to
promotion is slowest in New York and the average time to promotion
is the fastest in the high growth cities-Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston.
If a firm follows a strict up-or-out policy, then there simply would
not be any associates beyond the year in which associates are eligible
for promotion. Figure 8a shows what a strict up-or-out policy might
look like in the data. A softer up-or-out policy would look more like
Figure 8b, with some associates leaving the firm (or getting
promoted) before the promotion year and some staying on as
associates after the promotion year. Irrespective of associate exit
patterns before promotion, a strict up-or-out policy implies that at the
point in time where the firm evaluates associates (the "promotion
year") they are either promoted or let go. Thus, the firm would have
no associates of tenure greater than the promotion year.
A
weakening of the up-or-out system implies that firms retain associates

70. The median number of years to promotion has fluctuated over the same time
period between eight and nine years.
71. Angela Ward, Associates Forced to Ripen on the Vine, TEX. LAW., Jan. 19, 1998, at
27.
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Table 10. Promotion Statistics by Top Ten City

Atlanta

Boston

Chicago

Dallas

Houston
Los Angeles

New York

Philadelphia

San Francisco
Washington, D.C.

Promotion rate

1998

1999

2000

2001

6.3%

8.8%

6.2%

4.6%

[2002
6.1%

2003
4.4%

Avg. years to promotion

8.96

8.14

8.57

8.31

8.78

9.00

Promotion rate

5.9%

5.9%

6.6%

3.6%

4.9%

4.2%

Avg. years to promotion

9.64

9.38

9.27

9.88

8.76

10.04

Promotion rate

7.8%

7.7%

6.5%

6.1%

6.0%

6.4%

Avg. years to promotion

8.96

8.73

8.88

8.94

9.22

9.08

Promotion rate

9.2%

7.2%

6.4%

5.1%

5.4%

4.6%

Avg. years to promotion

8.52

8.42

9.06

9.31

9.99

8.67

Promotion rate

7.2%

6.3%

6.3%

4.1%

4.3%

4.4%

Avg. years to promotion

8.51

8.53

8.23

8.96

9.00

9.27

Promotion rate

5.4%

5.3%

4.5%

4.0%

3.4%

3.5%

Avg. years to promotion

9.41

9.33

10.26

10.92

9.82

10.45

Promotion rate

4.1%

3.8%

3.7%

2.9%

2.7%

3.0%

Avg. years to promotion

10.48

10.14

10.16

10.62

10.32

10.66

Promotion rate

5.8%

7.2%

6.7%

3.7%

4.6%

4.9%

Avg. years to promotion

10.14

9.83

10.06

10.59

10.17

10.36

Promotion rate

5.5%

4.7%

5.3%

3.5%

3.5%

2.8%

Avg. years to promotion

9.65

9.36

9.41

9.22

9.50

10.14

Promotion rate
Avg. years to promotion

5.2%
9.14

5.9%
9.36

5.3%
9.16

3.4%

3.7%

4.0%

9.54

9.20

8.86

whose peers have already been promoted.72 In short, existence of a

tail to the right of the promotion year is evidence that the firm is not
strictly following an up-or-out policy.
In order to measure the extent to which the industry follows an
up-or-out rule, we plot the total number of associates by years out of
school. (See Figure 9.) The slow increase in the early years indicates
that lawyers move into the industry (possibly from clerkships or other
government jobs) up until about year four or five. Rather than a
vertical drop, the number of associates declines slowly but steadily
over time. The lengthy tail, well beyond the median promotion age,
indicates that not all firms follow a strict up-or-out policy. To some
extent the slope of the line, especially around the median promotion
age measures the degree to which firms follow an up-or-out policy.
72. If a firm pushes back the promotion clock for all associates, in a class, but
maintains a strict up-or-out policy, the curve in Figure 8a would shift horizontally to the
right.
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The steeper the slope, the more closely firms apply an up-or-out rule.
The slope does not appear to have changed much over time,
indicating that up-or-out is actually still the predominant practice.
The horizontal shift from 1998 to 2004 is consistent with a lengthening
of the promotion clock.
Figure 8a. Strict Up-or-Out Policy
Number of
associates

9

Years out of school

Figure 8b. Soft Up-or-Out Policy
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Long-term
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n

Years out of school
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Figure 9. Number of Associates by Years Out of School
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One problem with the analysis above is that it treats all firms as if
they have the same promotion policies. But, in reality, the timing of
the promotion decision (as well as the use of an up-or-out policy)
varies by firm. Analysis of the sort performed in Figure 9 is again
confounded by aggregation problems. To see this, imagine that all
firms used strict up-or-out policies, but some promoted at Year 9,
some at Year 10, some at Year 11, etc., then it would appear (at the
industry level) that up-or-out was weak or nonexistent.
A potentially better way of measuring up-or-out policies is to
attempt to discern whether individual firms are using the policy. We
do this in the following way. We calculate, for each firm in each year,
the median years to promotion (the "promotion year"). We then ask
what percentage of associates at least as tenured as the promotion
year but not yet promoted in that year are still associates at the firm
two years later. We aggregate this ratio across firms and look to see
whether, through time, it appears that firms are less strict in their upor-out policies. We find some evidence for the weakening of up-orout at the individual firm level. In 1998, on average, 44% of those not
promoted by the promotion year are still at the firm as an associate
two years later. By 2004, this percentage had risen to 50%. Thus,
firms may be weakening up-or-out policies in response to the
increased reliance on business generation for a successful partnership.
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As an alternative to the permanent associate position some firms
may instead weaken up-or-out with the use off-track positions. These
firms are essentially retitling lawyers who are not promoted to other
permanent nonpartner positions. We calculate the number of offtrack lawyers by years out of school in Figure 10. There are more offtrack lawyers in 2004 than in 1998 across all years out of school and
this holds in the range of years around which a lawyer might have
been passed over for promotion. If we repeat this analysis at the firm
level, we find in 1998 that, on average, 4% of associates at least as
tenured as the median promotion age remain at the firm in off-track
positions two years later, and this percentage is constant through
time. Thus, while we find some evidence that firms are using offtrack positions as an alternative to the up-or-out model, they are not
actually increasingly using these titles over time for associates beyond
the promotion age.
IV. FUTURE RESEARCH

The Martindale directory is a rich dataset, ripe with possibility.
The analysis presented in this Article is merely suggestive of the kinds
of questions that could be answered. Having developed a basic
understanding of how law firms are structured both at the firm level
Figure 10. Number of Off-Track Lawyers by Years out of School
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and at the industry level will provide context for addressing a broader
set of industry and organizational issues in the future.
While we have emphasized that the largest firms are getting
larger, we have not yet attempted to explain the process by which
these firms are growing. Some firms may make acquisitions and
others may grow organically. Not all firms are growing; some are
clearly downsizing too. The Martindale data presents us with the
opportunity to study both how firms expand and shrink. We would
like to establish what strategies firms follow and address how
variation in growth strategies affects their choice of human resources
("HR") policies.
In addition to the impact of growth on HR policies, we can also
study more generally why firms vary in their choice of HR programs.
Some have argued that firms invest more in young associates than
they recoup in return.73 Why then do some firms choose to hire
straight out of law school (and train their lawyers) and others do not?
Why do some firms hire lawyers only from the elite law schools while
other firms hire from a broad array of schools? Why do firms vary in
the length of their associate tenures? In the strictness of their up-orout policies?
There are also a series of interesting questions to ask related to
legal careers and how lawyers' career paths differ. We can identify
how gender affects the career progression of associates and partners.
And, we can determine what kinds of firms do more to promote
gender equality. Lateral movement is also thought to be much more
common than it used to be, even at the associate level.7 4 Again, we
can examine how the career paths of lateral movers differ from those
who never move, and compare the careers of lawyers who move as
individuals to those who defect in groups. We can also ask whether
the career progression of lawyers who are narrowly specialized differs
from those with a general practice area and whether the point in time
at which a lawyer begins to specialize matters for promotion.
Without data on economic performance, it is difficult for us to
make normative statements about the success or failure of particular
firm strategies. We can look at organizational growth or longevity as
signals of success, but these are imperfect measures. Integrating some
economic performance data like the Am Law 200, for example, may
73. Frank Michael D'Amore, A Look at the Year Ahead for Laterals, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 14,2005, at 1.
74. See Paula A. Patton, Lateral Moves Now Part of Landscape, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9,
2001, at S5; The Real Reasons Your Associates Leave... and How to Keep Them, ILL.
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1998, at 1.
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at least enable us to answer normative questions about successful
strategies.
CONCLUSIONS

In this Article we examine empirically a number of possible
implications of the increase in corporate in-house legal departments
and the consequent decline of relationship lawyering for the structure
of the legal industry, the structure of law firms, and the nature of legal
careers. We find weak evidence of the demise of midsized firms at
the expense of large firms and small boutiques, though significant
evidence that the largest firms have grown substantially. We also
document a significant increase in the number and geographic
diversity of multi-office law firms. These trends are consistent with a
move by firms to compete with in-house legal departments by
offering a broader range of services, with greater depth, across
multiple jurisdictions.
We also document how and where leverage-the number of
associates per partner-has increased over the past seven years.
Overall leverage has increased, though not among firms of all sizes or
in all locations. Leverage is highest for the largest firms and smaller
firms, and slightly lower for midsized firms. It is also significantly
higher for multi-office firms and firms with New York City offices.
Leverage has been growing over the past seven years in small firms,
but not in the large firms. While the overall increase in leverage is
consistent with the need for firms to retain younger lawyers to do the
legal work that cannot be done by more senior lawyers, the patterns
of leverage changes are not entirely consistent with this story. We
would have expected to see this increase in leverage be at least as
great in large firms as in small ones if the reason was the need to do
the work that the rainmakers were bringing in.
Finally, we document changes in the nature of legal careers. We
show that the average time to promotion-the amount of time
between graduating from law school and being promoted-has
increased by about half a year in the past seven years. We also
present some weak evidence for a decline in the use of up-or-out
promotion systems by law firms. There has been a modest increase in
the likelihood that an associate, if not promoted by the average time
to promotion in her firm, will still be at the firm two years later. In
addition, there has been some increase in the use of "off-track"
lawyers in our sample of firms. Once again, these trends are broadly
consistent with an increasing divergence between the job of a partner
(rainmaking) and that of an associate (legal work), and an attempt on
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the part of firms to retain productive associates without promoting
them to partner.
Despite some weaknesses in these data (the short time frame,
our inability to distinguish between income partners and equity
partners, the lack of data on economic performance), we believe that
we have provided new data and some new insights on the possible
effects of changes in the nature of firm-client relations. Our findings
are broadly consistent with conventional wisdom about the effects of
the decline of relationship lawyering, though there are some pieces of
the puzzle that do not fit the overall picture. Of course, this may be
because we are not looking over a long enough time period, or our
data are insufficiently detailed. But we believe that we have at least
opened up some new avenues for exploration.
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APPENDIX

A.

Assigning ConsistentIDs
1. Assigning Consistent Lawyer IDs

We assume each ID refers to only a single lawyer and look for
instances where the same person has more than one ID.11 We identify
a list of lawyers that may potentially have more than one identifier by
finding lawyers with the same name and birth year, but two different
IDs. Because some name and birth year combinations may be
relatively common (e.g., John Smith, 1950) we use a lawyer's school
information to determine whether potential duplicates are indeed a
single individual.
If two potential duplicates list the same
undergraduate and law schools, then we treat them as one person and
76
assign a single ID.
2. Assigning Consistent Firm IDs
Similarly, we pinpoint all firms with identical names and two
different firm identifiers. From our list of potentially duplicated
firms, we automatically rule out cases where neither the lawyers nor
the time period overlap. We count firms as the same and assign a
single ID in cases where: (1) 100% of the lawyers from firm ID "a"
appear in firm ID "b," (2) less than 100% of the lawyers overlap, but
the location matches, or (3) less than 100% of the lawyers overlap,
but the time period overlaps. If both firm listings appear in the same
quarter and if any lawyers appear in both firm IDs, we can be
reasonably confident that they represent two different offices of the
same firm.77 Because firms change names with some frequency
(perhaps because they add a named partner, merge, or splinter), we
group duplicates under a single ID for the time period over which the
exact firm name (and not the firm ID) appears in the directory.7 8
75. Because lawyers may change names over time (perhaps due to marriage),
checking whether a single ID refers to two different lawyers is considerably more difficult.
76. In cases where potential duplicate lawyers list multiple schools, we first rule out
the possibility that two lawyers have simply switched IDs. We classify the remaining
duplicate cases as a single person as long as the potential duplicates have some overlap in
their schools and do not appear in the same time period for more than three quarters.
77. If there are any cases where two different offices of the same firm have different
firm IDs but no lawyer is dually listed then we will not be able to identify these offices as
the same firm.
78. For a handful of firms where the firm ID changes with only a slight variant (i.e.,
from Smith & Smith LLP to Smith & Smith) or one firm name clearly folds into the other,
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Since the current scope of our analysis studies firms by cross-section
rather than longitudinally, we need only ensure the consistency of
firm IDs within and not across years.7 9

3. Assigning Consistent Office IDs
Within firms, Martindale assigns a sequence number or office ID
to each separate office location.8" In order to incorporate the

reassignment of duplicated firms above and correct for any errors, we
apply the following criteria to establish consistent office IDs. First,
we assign any offices with the same zip code but different office IDs
to the same ID and also ensure that this ID refers to only one zip
code.81 Although a firm may have more than one office in the same
zip code, most zip code areas are fairly small, and we think it is
reasonable to treat any of these cases as a de facto single office.
Second, we ensure that every office ID refers to only a single
Metropolitan Statistical Area ("MSA"). 2 Third, we check cases
where multiple office IDs refer to the same MSA. We do not
combine these cases under a single office ID because MSAs are quite
large and many firms have multiple offices in the same MSA. A firm
in the Washington, D.C. MSA may have offices in both Washington,

D.C. and Fairfax, Virginia, for example. Therefore, we combine only
the cases where the street location matches. Last, we check instances

where a single office ID points to more than one street location in the
same quarter and separate these locations into different office IDs by
we combine duplicate firms into a single firm ID for the entire range over which the
original IDs appear.
79. Firm IDs are largely consistent across years because Martindale reuses the same
ID when it sends out update forms that allow a firm to revise its profile, including the firm
name. If a firm's ID changes within a year but not all lawyers are listed under the new ID,
we identify two different firms, when in reality there is only one. However, the fraction of
lawyers not listed in the new firm ID and not listed in any other firm is likely to be small
and thus, will not have a large impact on our analysis. In future work, we will establish
consistent firm IDs across years by coding as the same all firms where the percentage of
lawyers moving from one firm to the next is large.
80. Martindale records the main office as the first office in each firm. We retain the
original office IDs for the purpose of assigning a main office. See supra Part I.C.3.
81. Because data are both self-reported and historical, we use the current zip code for
each city-state-zip combination to account for any errors or changes over time. In cases
where the firm reported only a city-state combination and not a zip code, we use the zip
code for the center of that city-state combination. We use both the reported zip code and
the current assigned zip code to find cases where office IDs should be combined.
82. We use Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas defined by the Office of
Management and Budget as of November 2004 to identify city hubs. See Geography Div.,
U.S. Census Bureau, State-Based Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas Maps,
(last modified
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/maps/stcbsa-pg/stBased_2004-nov.htm
July 8, 2005).
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zip code.83 If office IDs do not overlap in time, different street
locations (or zip codes) simply reflect the relocation of an office.
B.

Eliminating Quarterly Duplicates
1. Assigning Lawyer to Quarterly Position

Using the standardized positions, we identify all lawyer-firmquarter combinations with more than one position. For each lawyer
in this list, we calculate the time range, or the minimum and
maximum quarter-year for each position and assign the lawyer (in the
duplicated quarters only) to the position which appears second in
chronological order from the first point in time that the new position
appears. Suppose a lawyer is listed as an associate from Q1 1997
through Q4 1998 and also as a partner from Q3 1998 through Q3
2002. Thus, the lawyer appears in two positions in Q3 and Q4 1998
and the algorithm specifies that we assign the lawyer to the partner
position in these quarters because the partner position is second in
chronological order. For cases where one position's time range
completely envelops the other, we assume that the enveloped position
is erroneous. If the ranges are identical, we first assume the lawyer is
a partner if partner is one of the possible positions, then an associate
if associate is one of the possible positions, and last an off-track
lawyer if off-track is one of the possible positions.
2. Assigning Lawyer to Quarterly Firm
Although it may be possible that lawyers listed in more than one
firm in a quarter actually work in both firms, we assume that a lawyer
must spend more of his or her time at one of those firms and the
following algorithm assigns dually listed lawyers to a single firm.
Because some lawyers list themselves both as individual practitioners
and as members of firms, we first assume that if a lawyer is listed at
one firm of at least five attorneys and one firm of less than five
attorneys then the lawyer actually works at the larger firm. Next, we
address the cases where a lawyer's position differs across duplicated
firms. If a lawyer is a partner in one firm, but not the other, we delete
the firm record in which the lawyer is not a partner. We repeat the
same procedure for the associate position relative to all other
remaining positions and then for the off-track position relative to all
83. By tracking the flow of lawyers from one office ID to another, we will identify
cases where two separate office IDs should actually be treated as one. See supra Part
I.C.3.
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other remaining positions. For the remaining cases of duplication, we
calculate the time ranges for each firm and assign lawyers to the firm
that appears second in chronological order from the first point in time
that the new firm appears. If the time ranges overlap entirely we
assume the lawyer works at the larger firm.14

84. In the rare instance that both firms are of the same size, we assign the lawyer to
the firm with the lowest firm ID number.

